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1 Introduction
In The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson elaborates and defends a novel form of
consequentialist moral theory, which he calls “multi-dimensional consequentialism”. One of the
“key claims” of this theory is that rightness is not all-or-nothing, but rather a matter of degree;
not binary, but scalar [Peterson, 2013, 8–13]. Actually, that’s two claims. One is negative:
rightness is not binary. The other is positive: rightness is scalar. I agree with only one half of
this, the positive half. That is, on the view I shall propose, rightness is both all-or-nothing and
a matter of degree.
That may sound paradoxical. So let me explain what I mean. On this view, there is a
property, right, which a thing—typically, an act—either has or has not. That’s the binary
bit. In addition, however, there is a comparative relation, more right (and cognate relations, less
right, equally right, etc.), which holds between things and, importantly, which allows intermediate
cases. That’s the scalar bit. An intermediate case is an act x such that, for some acts y and z,
x is more right than y, and less right than z. The existence of such cases is important because,
without them, we would not have degrees of rightness in the non-trivial sense Peterson wants.
Someone who believes in only two “degrees” of rightness, perfectly right and perfectly non-right,
may nonetheless say the former is more right than the latter.
There is no obvious reason to think that this property and this relation are mutually exclusive.
The view is, therefore, prima facie coherent, at least. I aim to show that it has even more going
for it. I begin by reviewing Peterson’s case for degrees of rightness, with which I largely agree.
I argue, however, that, although this argument may provide good reason to accept degrees of
rightness, it provides no reason to reject all-or-nothing rightness. This I do in part by showing
that similar considerations arise in other cases where we would not want to do away with the
relevant all-or-nothing concept (I give the example of circularity). Next, I argue that we also
need all-or-nothing rightness. My argument, in brief, is that without this concept, we cannot
adequately answer important moral questions. Finally, I suggest a way of having both concepts.
I propose an analysis of degrees of rightness which reduces these to all-or-nothing rightness.
2 The Case for Degrees of Rightness
Peterson’s argument for degrees of rightness rests on another key claim of multi-dimensional
consequentialism: that there is a plurality of incommensurable values [Peterson, 2013, 27–34].
So far as I can tell, however, these parts of the view are independent, and, in particular, the
case for degrees of rightness depends not on pluralism. Even a monist may appreciate a need for
degrees. Thus, the argument I give below, though in the same spirit as Peterson’s, is perhaps
somewhat simpler, since it makes no appeal to plural values.
The argument, briefly, is that without degrees of rightness we cannot make moral distinctions
that need to be made. Acts that are not morally equivalent may nonetheless by equivalent with
respect to whether they are right or wrong. Thus, merely by classifying acts as either right or
not right we cannot give a full account of moral situations. We must say, what’s more, whether
one act is more or less right than another.
Consider an example. One day, while strolling through town, you are approached by a tourist
who asks you for directions to one of the local attractions. Helping the tourist would cause you
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no significant inconvenience. You know the location she seeks and could easily instruct her how
to get there; no more urgent matter requires your immediate attention; and so on. What should
you do? Among the things you could do are the following:
(a) stop and give the requested directions,
(b) ignore the request and walk away,
(c) give false directions that will send the tourist far off course and, predictably, ruin her day.
Here is something we might say: (a) is right; (b) and (c) are not right. Few, I assume,
would disagree with this. But to say only this is not to tell the full moral story. This statement
discriminates between (a) and (b), and between (a) and (c), but not between (b) and (c). It
places (b) and (c) together in the same moral category, “not right”. But these acts are not
morally on a par. Our attitude to a person who sent the tourist off on a wild goose chase would
not be the same as our attitude to one who simply walked away (though we would not think
very highly of either). The gap in our story may be filled by introducing degrees of rightness.
The moral difference, we may say, is that (b) is more right than (c).
Or, at any rate, (c) is more wrong than (b). This would amount to the same thing if “more
right” were the inverse of “more wrong”, as, for example, “taller” is the inverse of “shorter”. But
I am not sure that it is. I am accordingly more confident in degrees of wrongness than degrees
of rightness. Still, since Peterson focuses on the latter, I will follow him in doing so here.
It is important to be clear on what this argument shows (if it shows anything). It does not
show that our non-comparative statement, “(a) is right; (b) and (c) are not right”, is false. It
shows at most that this statement is not the whole truth. The argument supports Peterson’s
positive claim, but not his negative claim, in other words. To emphasise this point, another
example will be helpful. What can be said about the three shapes, A, B, and C, shown in
Figure 1? Here is one thing we can say: A is a circle; B and C are not circles. But, again,
this does not tell the full story. This statement places B and C together in the same geometric
category, “non-circular”, but these are not geometrically equivalent. What we want to say is
that B is more circular than C. But surely we should not conclude, on this basis, that there
is no such property as being a circle. We should not, that is to say, be driven to a view about
circularity analogous to Peterson’s negative thesis about rightness. It is not wrong to say that
A is circle, or that B and C are not circles, even if it is wrong, in some sense, to say only this.
This is wrong, the argument suggests, in the sense of being incomplete, of failing to include some
relevant truth, not of including some falsehood.
The example may also serve another purpose. Given the similarities between the case of
rightness and the case of circularity, it seems natural to seek a general account that applies to
both. I return to this thought below.
3 The Case for All-or-Nothing Rightness
Moral theories purport to answer the question “What ought I to do?” But to say merely, for
example, that (a) is more right than (b), and (b) more right than (c), is not to answer this
question, not fully. Such comparative rightness judgements alone are insufficient to tell us what
to do. We need, in addition, a non-comparative judgement: for example, that (a) is right, and
only (a) is. A moral theory that confined itself to comparative judgements would not be doing
its job.
Figure 1: three shapes
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It is instructive to consider the analogy with belief suggested by Peterson [2013, 27]. As Peter-
son reminds us, the notion of all-or-nothing belief gives rise to puzzles which may be sidestepped
by eschewing this notion in favour of degrees of belief. For example, it is natural to suppose that
justified belief is closed under logical implication; for example, if I am justified in believing each
of two propositions, then I am justified in believing their conjunction. But there are well-known
counterexamples. For each lottery ticket, I am justified in believing that this ticket will not win.
But I am not justified in believing that no ticket will win. One proposed solution is to replace
all-or-nothing belief with degrees of belief, with credences or subjective probabilities. Rather
than ask simply whether I am justified in believing this or that proposition, ask what credences
I am justified in assigning to these propositions. A consistent credence function may give low
credence to the proposition that this ticket will win (for each ticket) but high credence to the
proposition that some ticket will win. This is no mystery.
Whatever the merits of this view in the case of justified belief, I do not think it can be
transferred smoothly to the case of right action. The reason is that belief and action differ
fundamentally. Belief can be divided; action cannot. I can distribute my credence between a
proposition and its negation, giving some credence to each. When I do so, I partly believe one
proposition, and partly believe the other. In this way, I divide my belief. But I cannot, in the
same way, divide my action between two acts. If my options include taking the 3:00pm train and
taking the 4:00pm train, then there is no way for me to partly do one and partly do the other. I
cannot divide myself in two, sending one half on the earlier train and the other half on the later
train. I could perhaps take the 3:30pm train, but that would be a way of doing neither act, not
a way of doing both.
Peterson advocates a decision procedure which, superficially, may seem a way of distributing
one’s action over several alternatives. But really it is not. Peterson’s suggestion is “randomisa-
tion”. In the above example, I may randomise by, say, tossing a coin to decide which train to
take. Peterson claims that randomisation is the most “fitting” response to situations in which
several alternatives are right to some degree. The probability that should be assigned to an
alternative, on Peterson’s view, is equal to the “force” of the alternative divided by the sum of
the forces of all alternatives, where force is a function degree of rightness and another quantity
which Peterson calls “strength” of rightness [Peterson, 2013, 117–21].
But randomisation is not distribution. To see this, consider again belief. Suppose my evidence
is neutral between P and ¬P . What should I do? One thing I could do—the rational thing, I
would say—is distribute my credence equally, giving 1/2 to P and 1/2 to ¬P . Another thing
I could do is toss a coin, giving 1 to P if it lands heads (and 0 to ¬P ), or 0 to P if it lands
tails (and 1 to ¬P ). Clearly, the latter approach is not a way of partly believing each of two
propositions. Whichever way the coin lands, I will believe one proposition completely, and the
other not at all. But the latter approach is Peterson’s randomisation. The former approach—the
rational one—has no analogue in the case of action.
Peterson might reject my initial premise, that moral theories are in the business of answering
the question “What ought I to do?” This question, he might say, belongs not to morality, but
to rationality.1 There are two problems with this. First, it is revisionary. Certainly, Peterson is
entitled, if he so wishes, to use “morality” to refer to a narrow subject matter consisting solely
of questions about degrees of rightness and no more. But then he risks merely “talking past”
the vast majority of moral theorists. His multi-dimensional consequentialism will not be a moral
theory in the ordinary sense, or not a complete one. Second, it seems that whatever reasons
Peterson offers for rejecting all-or-nothing morality, these same reasons will arise again in the
case of rationality, in which case the problem simply recurs. Peterson may merely have swept
the bump from under the moral carpet to the rational one.2
1Such a position is suggested by Peterson’s comments in response to the objection that endorsing randomisation
“annihilates the claim that moral rightness comes in degrees” [Peterson, 2013, 120].
2Peterson explicitly rejects the view that “we [should] introduce degrees also on the level of rationality”
[Peterson, 2013, 118]. But he gives no argument for rejecting it. Doing so, he says, would be beyond the scope of
the book. Fair enough. But it does leave a significant worry about his view unresolved.
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Figure 2: three shapes and most similar circles
4 How to Have Both
4.1 General Schema
The case for degrees of rightness, as we have seen, is not unique. Considerations of the sort
that justify positing degrees of rightness are also present other cases (for example, the case of
circularity). It seems desirable, therefore, to find a general account which applies to all these
particular instances.
Such an account is nicely suggested by the circle example. By saying that B is more circular
than C, what we mean is that B is closer to being a circle than C is. B is a better approximation
of a circle. This may be expressed more precisely in terms of similarity. Let B′ and C ′ be circles
maximally similar to, respectively, B and C. This is illustrated in Figure 2. To aid comparison,
B′ and C ′ are superimposed on B and C. Notice that B′ is more similar to B than C ′ is to C;
the dissimilarity between the former pair is less than that between the latter.3 This, I suggest,
is roughly what we mean by saying that B is more circular than C.
It is only rough because it rests on an over-simplification, namely, that there exist unique
circles maximally similar to B and C. This need not be so. But the analysis is easily adjusted,
in a familiar way, to accommodate this possibility. The result is is the following general schema:
x is at least as φ as y if and only if there exists some x′ such that
1. x′ is φ
2. for any y′, if y′ is φ then x′ is at least as similar to x as y′ is to y.
Substituting “right” or “circular” for φ yields an analysis of degrees of rightness or circularity.
A degree of rightness may be defined as an equivalence class under the relation of being equally
right (x and y are equally right if and only if they are at least as right as each other).
A virtue of this analysis is that it is neutral between theories of the right, or moral theo-
ries. Degrees of rightness may seem more at home in a consequentialist theory than in, say,
a deontological one. Consequentialism already gives centre stage to a notion, goodness, which
comes in degrees. Consequences are not merely good or bad, but better or worse. Deontology,
by contrast, sees right action as a matter of acting in accordance with strict, exceptionless rules,
such as “Tell the truth”. A given act must either satisfy the rule or not. How, then, can there be
degrees of rightness on such a view? Notice, however, that even among falsehoods, some may be
closer to the truth than others. A mild exaggeration has something true in the nearby vicinity;
a complete fabrication is not even in the same neighbourhood. The deontologist may therefore
say, in line with the proposed analysis, that the former are more right than the latter.
4.2 Similarity for Consequentialism
In order to fit this general analysis to consequentialism, we need to plug in an appropriate metric
of similarity between acts. In this section I will propose such a metric. I do not claim it to be
necessarily the best that the consequentialist can do. My main aim is merely to illustrate how
the general analysis might work in the case of consequentialism.
3I do not have an account of similarity between ellipses to offer, though I think one could be given. I hope
the judgements of similarity above are intuitive enough for present purposes. For philosophical discussion of
similarity, see, e.g., Lewis [1973].
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The metric I propose incorporates two dimensions: the value of the acts (or, more precisely,
the value of their consequences), and the value of the best alternatives. That is, the extent of
dissimilarity between acts α and β is determined by (1) the difference in value between α and
β, and (2) the difference in value between the best alternative to α and the best alternative to
β. (An alternative to an act is an act that could be done instead of this act. An alternative to
walking to work is taking a train, for example.)
Thus, for these purposes, an act may be represented as an ordered pair α = (α1, α2), where
α1 represents the first dimension of dissimilarity (the value of the act), and α2 the second (the
value of the best alternative). For simplicity, we will treat being an alternative as a reflexive
relation: every act is an alternative to itself. We must therefore require that α1 ≤ α2 (nothing
can be better than the best). And α is right if and only if α1 = α2.
We may then define the following metric of dissimilarity:
d(α, β) = |α1 − β1|+ |α2 − β2|
The dissimilarity between α and β, denoted by d(α, β), is given by the sum of the (absolute)
differences in each dimension of dissimilarity.4 Combined with this metric, the proposed analysis
implies that α is at least as right as β if and only if α2 − α1 ≤ β2 − β1. This follows from the
fact that for any act α, the minimum dissimilarity between α and any right act is α2−α1.5 The
rightness of an act is judged by how far it falls short of the ideal: the further short it falls —
that is, the greater the gap in value between this act and the best alternative — the less right it
is.
This might seem implausible because it takes into account only the difference between the
value of an act and the value of the best alternative, rather than the ratio of these two values.
Consider, for example, the acts α = (1, 10) and β = (91, 100). On my proposal, these acts are
equally right, because the difference is the same. One might feel, however, that β should be
regarded as more right than α. Whereas in the case of α, the act is only 10% as good of the best
alternative, in the case of β, it is 91% as good.
The trouble with this view is that it presupposes that the value of acts can be represented
on a ratio scale, and therefore that there is some non-arbitrary way to fix the zero-point of this
scale. Suppose, for example, we shift the zero-point “upwards” by uniformly subtracting 101
from each value. The result is to transform α and β into, respectively, α′ = (−100,−91) and
β′ = (−10,−1). By the same reasoning as above, it seems we should now say that α′ is more
right than β′. Whereas in the case of β′, the best alternative is only 10% as bad the act, in the
case of α′ it is 91% as bad.
It is doubtful, however, that there is a uniquely correct way to set the zero-point. A compar-
ative virtue of my proposal, therefore, is that it is insensitive to the zero-point. It requires only
a cardinal or interval scale, not a ratio scale.
4.3 Comparison with Lockhart’s Analysis
The analysis I’ve proposed is reductive. It reduces “more right” to “right”. Peterson discusses a
similarly reductive analysis, that proposed by Ted Lockhart:
x has a greater degree of moral rightness than y in situation S for agent A just in
case, if x and y were the only alternatives open to A in S, then x would be morally
right for A in S and y would be morally wrong for A in S. [Lockhart, 2000, 81]
The two analyses are not obviously incompatible. But one important difference is that my
analysis is more general. Lockhart’s analysis applies only to pairs of acts that are alternatives to
each other, that may be performed in the same situation. This seems a drawback. A person who
uses her mobile phone while watching a movie in a public cinema may be acting wrongly, but
surely not as wrongly as one who does the same while driving a heavy lorry on a motorway thereby
4This is a metric in the strict mathematical sense. In particular, it satisfies the following: d(x, y) ≥ 0;
d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y; d(x, y) = d(y, x); and d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z). This particular form of metric is sometimes
called a “taxicab metric”, because the distances it represents are like those travelled by a taxicab on a grid-like
network of streets.
5Suppose β is right and α1 ≤ β1 = β2 ≤ α2. Then we have d(α, β) = (β1 − α1) + (α2 − β2) = (α2 − α1) +
(β1 − β2) = α2 − α1. It is straightforward to show that for any right β, if either β1 < α1 or α2 < β2, then
d(α, β) > α2 − α1.
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causing a major accident. This seems a perfectly natural comparison to make. However, because
it involves comparing acts performed in different situations — by different agents at different
times — it is not a comparison that can be made using Lockhart’s analysis. My analysis, in
contrast, has no such limitation, and so in this respect, at least, it seems superior.
Peterson objects to Lockhart’s analysis on the basis of a certain implication it has:
It immediately follows from Lockhart’s proposal that if an agent is faced with only
two options, she will invariably perform an act that is either entirely right or entirely
wrong. From a multi-dimensional consequentialist point of view, this makes little
sense. [Peterson, 2013, 41]
My analysis does not share this implication. Consider a situation in which the agent has only
two alternatives, α and β. Suppose α has better consequences. Then α is right, and β is wrong
(not right). But it does not follow that β is “entirely wrong”, if that is taken to mean that no act
is more wrong (less right). Certainly, no act available in this situation is more wrong. But there
may be an act performed in another situation that is more wrong. Indeed, my analysis allows
the possibility that no act is entirely wrong. It could be that for any act α, there is another
β, such that α2 − α1 < β2 − β1. My analysis may, therefore, be more amenable to Peterson’s
general multi-dimensional approach.
5 Optional Add-ons
The analysis developed so far is, so to speak, the core package. I now want to suggest two
amendments designed to deal with potential objections.
5.1 Self-sacrifice
The first objection concerns the relevance of self-sacrifice to comparisons of rightness. Consider
an example. You are in a position to save either one, two, or three lives. The cost to you of
saving lives is cumulative: by saving each additional life you will incur an additional cost. But
the maximum total cost you may incur — if you save all three lives — is still small. I am also
in a position to save one, two, or three lives. But the cost to me is not cumulative. I will incur
the same small cost no matter how many I save. You save one. I save two.
The proposed analysis says that your act is less right than mine. The best thing that either
of us could have done is save three. We have both fallen short of that ideal, but you have fallen
further short than I. However, that seems wrong. Your act seems, in one important way, more
right than mine. Each of us should have saved more lives than we did. But you can defend your
failing to save more in a way that I cannot. You can say that saving more would have cost you
more. This may not be sufficient to justify your failure, but it is at least a relevant consideration.
I, on the other hand, cannot say even that much. I could have saved more at no further cost to
myself. My failing to save the third life is simply gratuitous. I have gratuitously allowed someone
to die; you have not.
What this highlights, I think, is a problem not with the general similarity-based approach I
have proposed, but rather with the particular similarity metric suggested above. That metric
considers only two dimensions of similarity. We could add a third dimension which takes into
account self-sacrifice in the necessary way. Working out the details of such a metric I leave as
an exercise for another time. I hope the general idea is clear enough for now.
5.2 Supererogation
Nothing can be more similar to anything than a thing is to itself; that is, for any x, y and z, x is
at least as similar to x as y is to z. This seems as near to a conceptual truth as anything could
be. Combined with the general analysis proposed above, it has the consequence that nothing can
be more φ than a thing that is φ, and that all things that are φ are equally φ. The threshold for
being φ is set maximally high. Only those things which are φ to the highest degree are counted
as being φ.
This seems fine in the case of circularity. Nothing can be more circular than a circle, and
all circles are equally circular. But it is more problematic in the case of rightness. It may be
thought that some right acts are more right than others, in particular, that a supererogatory act
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is more right than a merely permissible act; going beyond the call of duty is more right than
barely doing one’s duty and no more. We should not rule this out by definition.
This view may be accommodated by revising our general analysis as follows:
x is at least as φ as y if and only if there exists some x′ such that
1. x′ is maximally φ
2. for any y′, if y′ is maximally φ then x′ is at least as similar to x as y′ is to y.
If being maximally φ is the same as being φ, then the revised analysis reduces to the original.
This may be the case for circularity. In the case of rightness, however, we may wish to allow
that an act can be right without being maximally right. For example, we might say that α is
right if α1 ≥ α2 − k, where k > 0, and maximally right if α1 = α2. Combined with the revised
analysis, this implies, as before, that α is at least as right as β if and only if α2 − α1 ≤ β2 − β1.
The difference, however, is that it allows one right act to be more right than another right act.
This would be so, for example, if α1 = α2 and β1 = β2 − k.
It might be objected that the analysis is no longer reductive, as I claimed it was, because
the concept of being maximally φ already contains degrees of rightness. To be maximally φ, we
might say, is to be φ to the highest degree. But this seems not a decisive objection. Reductive
or not, the analysis may still provide an illuminating account of the relation between being right
and being more right.
6 Conclusion
The view of rightness I have proposed appears to share all the advantages of Peterson’s view,
but none of the disadvantages. Because it includes degrees of rightness, it allows comparative
rightness judgements of the sort we need to fully represent moral situations. Because it also
includes all-or-nothing rightness, it allows answers to the central moral question, “What ought
I to do?” Moreover, it provides a neat account of the relation between these two. Overall,
then, it seems to be a view that should be happily adopted by advocates of multi-dimensional
consequentialism, and by others too.
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